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In the years since deciding District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), the Supreme Court has largely abandoned 
the role of protecting American gun owners despite the text, history, and 
tradition of the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms.  The Supreme 
Court has failed to use the jurisprudential tools at its disposal to ensure that the 
fundamental right to arms is protected as robustly as other enumerated 
constitutional rights.  This failure is an acute one.  And it is unjustifiable across 
a wide variety of jurisprudential methodologies, from originalism to the non-
originalist approaches that were dominant during the era of the Warren and 
Burger Courts.  The Supreme Court must do more to protect this right.  With the 
elevation of Judge Amy Coney Barrett to Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the 
prospect of more robust judicial protection of Second Amendment rights has 
increased. 
There are two important lines of American jurisprudence that, while 
historically influential, are not receiving their due in contemporary debates about 
the scope and enforcement of the Second Amendment.  The first line of 
precedent stems from Footnote Four of the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 1  The second line of authority, also 
outlined in Footnote Four, arises from the Supreme Court’s traditional role of 
enforcing nationally accepted norms against outlier local majorities that are 
oppressing distinct and insular minorities. 2  Today, certain outlier jurisdictions 
dominated by large urban majorities are depriving gun owners, who are a distinct 
and disfavored minority in many of those jurisdictions, of Second Amendment 
rights that are fully recognized in the vast majority of states and localities.   This 
article discusses both lines of precedential authority.  Today’s Supreme Court 
can and should deploy these two principles to vindicate Second Amendment 
rights from continued attacks, and to roll back outlier laws enacted by only a few 
jurisdictions that choose intentionally to ignore the U.S. Constitution as written 
and refuse to be bound by Supreme Court precedent.   
                                                 
 1. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 2. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction & Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 
370 (1992). 
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I.  THE ROBERTS COURT SHOULD USE THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TOOLS AT ITS 
DISPOSAL TO ENFORCE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
A.  Carolene Products Footnote Four 
One of the most mainstream and enduring theories of legal interpretation of 
the U.S. Constitution3 is the one articulated in Footnote Four of the Supreme 
Court’s 1938 opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Company.4 
In Carolene Products, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Carolene Products Company could be criminally indicted for shipping in 
interstate commerce a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil 
made in imitation or semblance of condensed milk or cream.5  The company 
raised various constitutional challenges to the indictment, arguing that it was 
beyond the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and that the 
indictment violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as 
well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by depriving the 
defendant of its property without due process of law.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the indictment could stand because the 
underlying statute was constitutional.7  In so ruling, the Supreme Court applied 
a broad reading of the Commerce Clause, and effectively held that statutes 
restricting property rights or economic liberties would be upheld if the law in 
question had a “rational basis” in fact or experience. 
But the Supreme Court left itself a loophole to its newfound judicial restraint 
for what it considered to be more important rights.  The groundwork for this 
judicial enforcement loophole was seeded by the opinion’s Footnote Four, which 
is generally viewed as the most famous footnote in U.S. legal history.8 
Footnote Four states: 
 There may be [a] narrower scope for operation of the presumption 
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
[A]mendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now 
whether legislation which restricts those political processes, which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, 
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types 
                                                 
 3. See Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on 
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 690 
(1991). 
 4. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 5. Id. at 146. 
 6. Id. at 146–47. 
 7. Id. at 154. 
 8. Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 
46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004). 
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of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations 
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or 
national, . . . or racial minorities. . . or whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.9 
Footnote Four empowers the Supreme Court to withhold its customary 
deference to enactments by elected legislatures when a piece of contested 
legislation “affect[s] rights specifically mentioned in the [C]onstitution;” when 
it “interferes with the democratic process;” or when it “affects those ‘discrete 
and insular minorities’ for whom the democratic process does not work fairly.”10 
1.  Footnote Four and Its Progeny Identify Three Situations Where Robust 
Judicial Review of Legislation Is Justified 
Legal scholars and commentators view the articulation of Footnote Four as a 
“pivotal moment in the history of the Court.”11  The ideas the footnote expressed 
“laid out the path the Court would follow in the twentieth century” to “protect[] 
minorities and civil rights,” and “the political process.”12  Indeed, many 
constitutional scholars are of the opinion that Footnote Four explains and 
“encompasses much of the ensuing half-century of constitutional law.”13 
Without belaboring the footnote’s history and the case law it helped inspire14, 
it suffices to state that courts should give only limited deference to a legislature 
when a statute or regulation concerns (a) the fundamental, enumerated 
individual rights set forth in the Bill of Rights, incorporated against the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment (the “preferred freedoms doctrine”), (b) the 
protection of various minority groups such as racial, national, or religious 
groups, including groups that constitute “discrete and insular minorities”, and 
(c) the protection of the voting processes necessary to ensure fair and free 
elections and appropriate political representation.15 
Two of the foregoing jurisprudential tools are potentially relevant to protect 
Americans who seek to exercise their Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms: (a) the preferred freedoms doctrine, which permits the Court to exercise 
greater judicial scrutiny of laws, which restrict rights or liberties guaranteed by 
                                                 
 9. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 10. Gilman, supra note 8, at 165–66. 
 11. Id. at 166. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Farber and Frickey, supra note 3.  See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1980); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960). 
 14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 n.16 (1983); Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 15. See generally Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
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the first ten amendments,16 and (b) the doctrine protecting discrete and insular 
minorities from hostile and oppressive laws enacted by local majorities. 
2.  Understanding Footnote Four’s First Jurisprudential Tool: The 
Preferred Freedoms Doctrine 
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court increased its vigilance when freedoms 
of speech, press, or religion were at issue.  In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court 
distinguished fundamental rights, those that represented “the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty,” as being entitled to greater protection against state 
abridgment, in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17  In Carolene Products Footnote Four, which was decided one 
year later, the Court specifically allowed for enhanced judicial scrutiny of laws 
that appear “to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those 
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.”18 
Originally, scholars understood the language in Footnote Four to evoke what 
was known as the preferred freedoms position.19  As one commentator has 
explained, “While modern scholars, critics and admirers alike, agree on the 
political process, minority-representation interpretation [of Footnote Four], it is 
very different from the early understanding of the footnote.”20  In its first 
incarnation, Footnote Four stood for the opposite of value-free adjudication.  It 
stood instead for the “preferred position” of certain freedoms—a firmly value-
based position.  As one commentator asserts: 
The doctrine of the ‘preferred position’ was that personal rights 
(meaning primarily freedom of speech and religion) were to be 
preferred to (given more protection than) economic rights, not because 
of their role in the political process, but because of their ‘sanctity,’ 
their ‘elevated rank in the hierarchy of values,’ or simply their ‘explicit 
statement in the Bill of Rights.’21 
 The idea being that: 
 The usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the 
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable 
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.  That priority 
                                                 
 16. A separate but related concept arising out of Carolene Products and similar Supreme 
Court precedents is called the “Preferred Position.”  This doctrine “expresses a judicial standard 
based on a hierarchy of constitutional rights so that some constitutional freedoms are entitled to 
greater protection than others.”  Richard L. Pacelle Jr., Preferred Position Doctrine, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1008/preferred-
position-doctrine (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 17. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 18. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 19. Gilman, supra note 8, at 191. 
 20. Id. at 179. 
 21. Id. 
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gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious 
intrusions.  And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, 
which determines what standard governs the choice.22 
The current understanding of Footnote Four is different from the original 
understanding.23  Today, Footnote Four is considered significant because it 
allows federal courts to ensure that the political processes are open and available 
for “discrete and insular minorities” (category two) who would be 
disenfranchised without court intervention.24  As commentators acknowledge, 
“[t]oday, the footnote is understood as standing for an argument that attempts to 
legitimate judicial review on the basis of the flaws in the political process.”25 
The Roberts Court would be well-advised to go to back to the earliest 
understanding of Footnote Four and learn from its teachings.  The right to bear 
arms, guaranteed by the Second Amendment and incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, falls within Footnote Four’s doctrine of “preferred freedoms”; 
thus, any legislation that attempts to restrict Second Amendment freedoms 
should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny and greater protection against 
state abridgment. 
3.  Understanding Footnote Four’s Second Jurisprudential Tool: The 
Concept of “Discrete and Insular Minorities” 
Beyond the preferred freedoms doctrine, Footnote Four gives the courts 
another equally important protective doctrine.  For several decades, the Supreme 
Court has drawn inspiration from Footnote Four’s phrase “discrete and insular 
minorities.”  This is the second jurisprudential tool created by Footnote Four, 
which permits the Court to give only limited deference to the legislature. 
To decide whether a group constitutes a discrete and insular minority, there is 
a long list of factors a court considers.  Some of those factors include whether 
the person or group has been disadvantaged historically or has historically 
lacked effective representation in the political process.26  Race, religion, national 
origin, and alienage have figured prominently in making this determination, but 
this list of relevant considerations is not exhaustive. 
In Part III of this Article, I make the case that gun owners in certain hostile 
jurisdictions are discrete and insular minorities lacking political power or 
influence.  When the current Supreme Court considers Carolene Products 
                                                 
 22. Id. at 189 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)) (statement of Justice 
Rutledge) (citations omitted). 
 23. See id. at 183. 
 24. In short, “the Court polices the twin gates of the political process: voting and speech,” and 
“the Court protects, through whatever constitutional provision is appropriate, those the government 
stigmatizes.”  L.A. Powe, Does Footnote Four Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 197–98 
(1994). 
 25. Gilman, supra note 8, at 167. 
 26. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2012), 
appeal dismissed, 724 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Footnote Four in the context of today’s ideological debates regarding Second 
Amendment rights, the Court should take inspiration from the discrete and 
insular minority doctrine. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Historical Role of Enforcing Nationally Accepted 
Norms Against Local Outliers Who Fail to Keep Up with the Mainstream 
The Supreme Court has a long-standing practice of protecting constitutional 
rights that are popular nationwide against infringement by outlier local 
jurisdictions that seek to oppress local minorities.  To illustrate: when the Court 
struck down Connecticut’s ban on contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut27, 
it was merely enforcing a mainstream national norm against an extremely 
unusual local law.  When the Court invalidated Texas’s sodomy law in Lawrence 
v. Texas28, it was merely putting the final period on the handwriting that was 
already on the wall for these types of laws. 
But here, rather than requiring the Court to vindicate or invent a minority right 
that has no “populist” or popular support in America (as opposed to vindicating 
a purported right supported only by America’s urban, coastal elites), enforcing 
the right to bear arms against a very few outlier jurisdictions fits squarely within 
one of the Court’s traditional roles, that is, protecting local minorities from 
hostile legislation that is out of step with, and contrary to, the national baseline.29  
Unlike several other rights the Court has “discovered” in the Constitution—and 
then enforced against majority will—the Second Amendment has strong 
populist or popular support throughout most of the Nation.30  Vigorously 
enforcing that right against the handful of outlier states and localities that 
continue to refuse to fully recognize it is strongly supported by the Court’s 
accepted role in protecting local minorities in those out-of-step jurisdictions 
from being targeted by laws that are far outside the national mainstream. 
II.  APPLYING FOOTNOTE FOUR’S PREFERRED FREEDOMS DOCTRINE TO 
SECOND AMENDMENT LITIGATION 
It is well established that there is no “hierarchy among . . . constitutional 
rights.”31  None other than Justice Felix Frankfurter explained this in his famous 
dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.  Justice 
Frankfurter wrote, 
                                                 
 27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 28. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 29. See Klarman, supra note 2, at 16–18; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 370. 
 30. “According to reports such as: ATF Firearms Commerce in the United States, ATF 
AFMER and Congressional Research Service data, there are an estimated 434 million firearms in 
civilian possession in the United States.”  NSSF Releases Most Recent Firearm Production Figures, 
NSSF (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/nssf-releases-most-recent-firearm-production-
figures/. 
 31. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 628 (1989). 
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[t]his Court has recognized, what hardly could be denied, that all the 
provisions of the first ten Amendments are ‘specific’ prohibitions. . . .  
But each specific Amendment, in so far as embraced within the 
Fourteenth Amendment, must be equally respected, and the function 
of this Court does not differ in passing on the constitutionality of 
legislation challenged under different Amendments.32 
As to the Second Amendment, the text and original understanding of the 
document demand that conclusion.  Those who framed and ratified the 
Constitution did not assign “weights” to the various values, interests, and rights 
they codified; nor did they attempt to list them in order of importance or provide 
any basis for prioritizing some provisions over others.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that the Second Amendment is not a “second-class 
right”33 that can be “singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment.”34  To the contrary, the very text of the Second Amendment is phrased 
in absolute terms (“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed”35) unlike some other amendments that have some measure of 
judgment built in (i.e., Fourth Amendment right to be secure against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures”; Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
“excessive bail” and “excessive fines”36). 
Today’s gun owners rank the right to own guns as comparable in importance 
to their individual rights to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and 
the right to vote. 37  Like the founding generation that won the Revolution and 
wrote the Bill of Rights, contemporary American gun owners regard the right to 
bear arms as “the true palladium of liberty” in our republic.38  Gun owners and 
                                                 
 32. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 33. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 34. Id. at 778–79. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VIII. 
 37. Kim Parker, et al., America’s Complex Relationship With Guns 30 PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 
22, 2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/americas-complex-relationship-with-
guns/. 
 38. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769–70 (citations omitted) 
(“Founding-era legal commentators confirmed the importance of the right to early 
Americans.  St. George Tucker, for example, described the right to keep and bear arms 
as ‘the true palladium of liberty’ and explained that prohibitions on the right would place 
liberty ‘on the brink of destruction. . . .’  ‘The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms 
has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers 
a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will 
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and 
triumph over them.’ 
Id. (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1890, 
p. 746 (1833)). 
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non-gun owners agree that “freedom of speech, the right to vote, the right to 
privacy, and freedom of religion are essential to their own sense of freedom.”39 
The preferred freedoms doctrine allows for enhanced judicial scrutiny of laws 
that attempt to restrict the first ten amendments to our Constitution.  The Second 
Amendment falls squarely within this category of freedoms deserving of the 
Court’s enhanced protection.  The Court in Heller v. District of Columbia and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago recognized the right to bear arms, which is 
recognized by the Second Amendment, as a fundamental right.40  Throughout 
the twentieth century, and as discussed supra41, the Supreme Court has widely 
expanded the realm of protected activities under the First, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.  In contrast, when it comes to the Second Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has largely remained silent, thereby permitting to go 
unchallenged numerous restrictions—and not expansions—of that fundamental 
right.  The Roberts Court should follow the lead of the Warren and Burger Courts 
and invoke the preferred freedoms doctrine articulated by Carolene Products 
Footnote Four to enforce and broaden Second Amendment rights. 
III.  APPLYING FOOTNOTE FOUR’S DISCRETE AND INSULAR MINORITY 
PROTECTION AND THE NATIONAL BASELINE DOCTRINE TO THOSE AMERICANS 
SEEKING TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN POLITICALLY 
HOSTILE METROPOLITAN AREAS 
A.  Gun Owners Are A Discrete and Insular Minority 
Gun owners in those deep blue urban jurisdictions have a strong argument that 
they are discrete and insular minorities under Footnote Four.42 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically held that members of the 
LGBTQ community constitute a discrete and insular minority, it is still helpful 
to discuss the sort of legal analysis that might ultimately give rise to such a 
finding, which would have implications in the Second Amendment context. 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management is an instructive 2012 
opinion from the U.S. District Court from the Northern District of California.43  
There, the district court found that homosexuals are entitled to the same 
heightened legal protections as individuals falling within a recognized class of 
                                                 
 39. Parker, supra note 3, at 30. 
 40. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 780 (2010). 
 41. See supra Section I. 
 42. The concept of discrete and insular minorities arises usually in the context of Equal 
Protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.  But that does not mean that a class of gun 
owners cannot benefit from the inspiration and analysis of Carolene Products Footnote Four when 
they assert various legal claims including, but not limited to, claims under the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
 43. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
92 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.1:1 
discrete and insular minorities, like African Americans or women.  The Golinski 
court reasoned: 
[T]he court in High Tech Gays, in performing the analysis of the issue 
of whether the legislature’s classification based on homosexuality 
calls for heightened scrutiny, relied on the mistaken assumption that 
sexual orientation is merely ‘behavioral,’ rather than the sort of deeply 
rooted, immutable characteristic that warrants heightened protection 
from discrimination. . . .  The court found that “[h]omosexuality is not 
an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence fundamentally 
different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define 
already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes.  The behavior of 
such already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identification’. . . 
.  The Supreme Court has since rejected this artificial distinction, 
noting that its more recent precedent ‘have declined to distinguish 
between status and conduct in the context’ of sexual orientation. . . .   
In Lawrence, the Court noted that ‘when homosexual conduct is made 
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination. . . .’  
‘While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct 
targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being 
homosexual.  Under such circumstances, the law is targeted at more 
than conduct.  It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.’  
Accordingly, the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in High Tech Gays on 
the appropriateness of applying heightened scrutiny to gay men and 
lesbians because their defining characteristic is immutable has been 
severely undermined by more recent and overriding precedent.44 
The Golinski court proceeded to analyze the factors to determine whether a 
class is entitled to suspect status and thus deserving of heightened scrutiny.  
First, it found that “lesbians and gay men have experienced a long history of 
discrimination.”45  So have gun owners in outlier states, which have subjected 
them to long prison terms for peaceable activity, such as the mere possession of 
a handgun (Chicago and some of its suburbs) , or a firearm that is not registered 
(District of Columbia), or common rifles that are not registered (New York), or 
ammunition without a state-issued firearms identification card (Illinois) or 
simple possession of a magazine holding more than ten rounds, or bringing 
ammunition into the jurisdiction from out of state.46 
                                                 
 44. Id. at 984–85 (citations omitted). 
 45. Id. at 985. 
 46. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 265.01-b; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-3(j), 2C:39-
5(a), 2C:43-3(b)(2), 2C:43-6(a)(4), 2C:44-1(f); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-202w(b), (c), 53a-35a; 
D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 30314 (2020); 430 ILCS § 65/2(a); N.Y.C. 
ADMIN. CODE § 10-303. 
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Second, the court found that “sexual orientation has no relevance to a person’s 
ability to contribute to society.”47  At least as much could be said for gun owners, 
who may make extraordinary contributions to society in times of danger or 
war.48 
Third, the court considered whether a characteristic “is immutable or 
otherwise not within the members’ control,” and then softened that factor when 
it found that “a person’s sexual orientation is so fundamental to one’s identity 
that a person should not be required to abandon it.”49  Based on history, culture, 
and the innate human drive to survive, gun ownership may be as fundamental to 
one’s identity as any other characteristic.  The massive lines surrounding gun 
stores across the United States during the 2020 Coronavirus crisis and summer 
riots illustrates the point.  As I wrote elsewhere, “[s]hopping lists across the 
country, in addition to including toilet paper, hand sanitizer, and canned goods, 
now suddenly list firearms at the top.”50  So too does the fact that the 
overwhelming number of states including New Jersey, Illinois and Delaware 
(not to mention the United States Department of Homeland Security) declared 
firearms stores to be “essential businesses” that were permitted to stay open 
during the crisis.51 
Fourth and last, the court applied the factor of whether the subject group is “a 
minority or politically powerless,” finding that “although not completely 
politically powerless, the gay and lesbian community lacks meaningful political 
power,” and are “a politically vulnerable minority.”52 
That is indisputably the plight of gun owners in outlier states, which in many 
legislative sessions are faced with increased restrictions and the creation of new 
minefields that gun owners must traverse at the risk of felony convictions and 
imprisonment.53  Gun owners in states such as New York, New Jersey, and 
California have long suffered abuse for seeking to exercise their fundamental 
                                                 
 47. Id. at 986. 
 48. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazism, the Second Amendment, and the NRA: A Reply to 
Professor Harcourt, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 113, 128–30 (2006); David B. Kopel, Lethal Laws, 
15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 374–78 (1995). 
 49. Golinski, 824 F.Supp. 2d at 986–87. 
 50. Mark W. Smith, Second Amendment Historian Stephen Halbrook Demonstrates that 
Americans Have—and Always Had—a Fundamental Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home, 
FEDSOC BLOG (March 31, 2020), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/second-amendment-
historian-stephen-halbrook-demonstrates-that-americans-have-and-always-had-a-fundamental-
right-to-carry-firearms-outside-of-the-home. 
 51. Zusha Elinson, Gun Stores Ruled Essential Businesses During Coronavirus Shutdowns, 
WALL ST. J. (March 30, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gun-stores-ruled-essential-
businesses-during-coronavirus-shutdowns-11585601189. 
 52. Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 987–89 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)). 
 53. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 265.01-b; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-3(j), 2C:39-
5(a), 2C:43-3(b)(2), 2C:43-6(a)(4), 2C:44-1(f); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-202w(b), (c), 53a-35a; 
D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 30314 (2020); 430 ILCS § 65/2(a); N.Y.C. 
ADMIN. CODE § 10-303. 
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right to keep and bear arms: New York Governor Andrew Cuomo suggested that 
gun owners leave New York;54 San Francisco declared a gun rights group a 
“domestic terrorist” organization;55  “New York routinely flouts federal 
protections for traveling with firearms by arresting and prosecuting air travel 
passengers who have checked firearms in their baggage.”56  New York City 
requires a “premises license” merely to possess a handgun within the home, and 
with extremely limited exceptions the licensee cannot carry the handgun outside 
the four walls of his or her home.  The license takes at least six months to obtain, 
requires an in-person interview, and involves intrusive inquiries into everything 
from the applicant’s criminal history, mental health, failure to pay debts, driving 
history, and “moral character.”  It can be denied or revoked at the City’s sole 
discretion.  Only a little over 1% of households have such a license.  In short, 
the “right” to keep and bear arms is destroyed for most City residents.57 
Based on the above four factors, the Golinski court held that “gay men and 
lesbians are a group deserving of heightened protection against the prejudices 
and power of an often-antagonistic majority.”58  The district court deemed gay 
men and lesbians to be a discrete and insular minority, thus legislation adversely 
affecting homosexuals was subject to heightened scrutiny. 
As articulated above, Americans seeking to exercise their right to keep and 
bear arms are akin to the gay men and lesbians in the Golinski case.  The act of 
owning, possessing or using a firearm is, at the most basic level, a behavior or 
form of conduct, precisely the finding of the district court in Golinski concerning 
gay men and lesbians.59  Though gun ownership is a voluntary activity, there 
appears to be little reason why this alone would cause Second Amendment 
advocates to fall outside the additional protections afforded to “discrete and 
insular minorities.”  There can be no more inherent, essential human trait than 
the urge to protect oneself, one’s family, and one’s community from harm.60  By 
virtue of their conduct alone, gun owners in hostile jurisdictions constitute a 
discrete and insular minority entitled to additional protections under the law. 
                                                 
 54. Heather Long, Opinion, Conservatives Aren’t Welcome in New York, According to 
Governor Cuomo, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2014, 8:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/jan/24/governor-cuomo-conservatives-not-welcome-new-york. 
 55. Janie Harr, NRA Declares Victory over San Francisco’s ‘Terrorist’ Resolution, 
MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020, 5:43 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/02/nra-san-
francisco-mayor-retreats-on-terrorist-resolution. 
 56. E.g., Torraco v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 615 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010). 
See discussion in STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK § 4.7 (2020). 
 57. New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), 
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (per curiam) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 58. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 59. See id. at 985 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has since rejected this artificial 
distinction, noting that its more recent precedent ‘have declined to distinguish between status and 
conduct in the context’ of sexual orientation.”). (emphasis added). 
 60. See David Kopel, The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 172 (2005). 
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B.  Gun Owners Constitute A Discrete and Insular Minority Group 
in Politically Hostile Metropolitan Areas 
Lawful gun use and ownership are enormously popular and widespread 
nationwide61, which is contrary to what many in the mainstream media would 
have you believe.  Following its 2010 decision in McDonald, during the 
Supreme Court’s nearly decade-long hiatus from Second Amendment 
jurisprudence, the popularity and significance of the Second Amendment 
continued to grow.  Forty-four out of the fifty states allow law-abiding and 
responsible citizens to carry firearms in public without any particularly onerous 
obstacles.62  Specifically, about twenty-six states now recognize the right to 
carry a handgun in public for self-defense by issuing gun permits to all 
qualifying, law-abiding adults on a “shall issue” basis.63  In eighteen states, no 
carry permit is required for citizens to carry a concealed firearm.64  There are 
somewhere between six and eight outlier states that significantly restrict the 
Second Amendment rights of their residents (and other Americans who happen 
to be passing through).65 
                                                 
 61. See infra, Part III.B.1.a; Lydia Saad, What Percentage of Americans Own Guns?, GALLUP 
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/264932/percentage-americans-own-guns.aspx  
(“Thirty percent of U.S. adults say they personally own a gun, while a larger percentage, 43%, 
report living in a gun household.”); Larry Keane, Americans Vote Yes in a Landslide for Gun Sales, 
NSSF, (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/americans-vote-yes-in-a-landslide-for-gun-sales/ 
(“NSSF [National Shooting Sports Foundation] released the adjusted National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS) figures for October [2020].  They aren’t record-breaking.  
They’re a record-shattering 1.76 million background checks completed for the sale of a firearm 
across the nation.  That brings the annual total to 17.2 million, leaving the previous record in the 
rear-view mirror.  That was 15.7 million background checks in 2016, also an election year, when 
Hillary Clinton promised to re-enact the failed 1994 Assault Weapons Ban.”). 
 62. Stephen Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: A “Right of the People” or a Privilege 
of the Few? Part 1, FEDERALIST SOC. REV. (Mar. 2020), 
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/to-bear-arms-for-self-defense-a-right-of-the-people-
or-a-privilege-of-the-few. 
 63. At least forty-two states, in fact, either have a de jure or de facto “shall issue” system, or 
don’t require a permit for public carry at all.  See Gun Laws, NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC. INST. LEGIS. 
ACTION, https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).  Another two states are 
formally “may issue” but typically “shall issue” in practice.  See Halbrook, supra note 62.  Of note, 
so-called “shall-issue” states are states in which the issuing authorities are required to issue a permit 
to an applicant who meets an objective statutory criteria.  In contrast, so-called “may issue” states 
are states that grant government actors, often law enforcement agents, greater discretion in granting 
or denying requests for carry permits.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-717, GUN 
CONTROL: STATES’ LAWS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY PERMITS VARY ACROSS 
THE NATION 2 (2012). 
 64. U.S. Constitutional Carry Association Constitutional Carry/Unrestricted/Permitless 
Carry, USCCA, https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/resources/terminology/types-of-concealed-
carry-licensurepermitting-policies/unrestricted/. 
 65. The following six states ban either the carrying or possession of a handgun without a 
license, issuance of which is limited at the discretion of a governmental entity based on standard-
less criteria like “good cause:” California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York.  See CA. PENAL CODE §§ 25400, 26150(a)(2), 26155(a)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-9, 134-
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That the vast majority of states fully respect the right to bear arms does not 
detract from the assertion that gun owners residing in the few outlier or 
metropolitan majority jurisdictions constitute discrete and insular minorities.  
That the right to bear arms is an extremely popular right nationwide only 
highlights the extreme injustice suffered by Second Amendment enthusiasts 
residing in the eight or so outlier jurisdictions that severely restrict guns.  These 
Americans lack political power or influence in those jurisdictions and, as a 
consequence, they enjoy far fewer Second Amendment freedoms when 
compared to gun owners in the other forty-two states.  Because the existence and 
exercise of a fundamental Constitutional right should not be dependent on an 
American citizen’s state of residency, gun owners in these outlier jurisdictions 
are discrete and insular minorities in need of the Supreme Court’s protection. 
1.  The Great American Gun Control Debate Is About Culture and Values 
The debate over the Second Amendment and gun control is less about crime 
rates, risk assessment, or policy choices than values and culture.66  Those who 
embrace the right to keep and bear arms “tend to be rural, Southern or 
Western,”67 and for them “guns symbolize a cluster of positive values,” 
including honor, independence, and “individual self-sufficiency.”68 
                                                 
51(a); MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW, §§ 4-203(a), (b)(2), 4-303(a), MD. CODE. PUB. SAFETY § 5-
306(a)(6)(ii); MASS. GEN. LAW 140 §§ 131(a), (b), (d); 269 § 10(a); N.J. STAT. 2C:39-5(b), 2C:58-
4(d); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01, 265.20(a)(3), § 400.00(2), (3), (7). See also Gun Laws, NRA-
ILA, https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2020).  Connecticut is technically a 
may-issue state for purposes of concealed carry permits, but it operates more like a shall-issue state.  
While CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28(b) says the authority “may issue” a carry permit, that statute 
specifies detailed objective requirements (like training) and disqualifications (like a felony record).  
In Kuck v. Danaher the court noted that the issuing authority “is afforded circumscribed discretion 
to determine whether a particular applicant seeking a pistol permit would pose a danger to the 
public if entrusted with a firearm.”  822 F. Supp.2d 109, 129 (D. Conn. 2011).  There is no 
requirement that the applicant show “need” or “good cause.”  Illinois requires a Firearms Owner 
Identification card to possess either a firearm or ammunition.  However, the disqualifying criteria 
(though considerably broader than under federal law) are largely objective in nature.  Illinois is a 
shall-issue state for concealed carry permits. 
 66. Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 3, 3 (2003); Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of 
Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L. 
J. 569, 571 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1293–94 (2003); Gary Kleck, Crime, 
Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel Application of the 
General Social Surveys, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 387, 400–01 (1996); WILLIAM R. TONSO, GUN 
AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND EXISTENTIAL ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO 
FIREARMS (1982); JAMES D. WRIGHT, ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE 
IN AMERICA (1983); RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992). 
 67. Kahan, supra note 66, at 4. 
 68. Id.; see Wright, supra note 66, at 113 (stating values of gun culture “are best typified as 
rural rather than urban: they emphasize independence, self-sufficiency, mastery over nature, 
closeness to the land”). 
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In contrast, those who disparage or discount the Second Amendment are 
disproportionately coastal, “urban” and “Eastern.”69  They deem guns to be 
“abhorrent and alarming” vestiges of a violent, primeval and alien past, while 
viewing gun control as “symbolizing a competing set of positive values,” 
including “civilized nonaggression . . . and social solidarity.”70  This is a clash 
of cultures—a fundamental disagreement about “alternative views of what 
America is and ought to be.”71  And “[i]n such disputes, citizens care less about 
how a particular law will [actually] affect behavior [and public safety] than they 
do about what the adoption of that law will say about the authority of contested 
moral values and about the relative status of the social groups and cultural styles 
associated with those values.”72 
“During the 1960s and 1970s, a tremendous cultural shift took place among 
American elites” with respect to firearms: “[i]n 1960, it was unexceptional that 
a liberal Northeastern Democrat, such as John F. Kennedy, would join the 
NRA.”73  “But by the early 1970s, gun ownership itself was reviled by much of 
the urban intelligentsia,”74 who complained bitterly that “‘Americans cling with 
pathetic stubbornness’ to ‘the supposed right to bear arms,’ and refuse to adopt 
European-style gun control laws.”75  The notion of guns for self-defense in the 
hands of common citizens came to be seen as an insult to a modern, 
sophisticated, and well-ordered society.76 
The urban liberals of the North and East, who for decades had been content 
with the U.S. Supreme Court writing their values into law, were dismayed 
because Heller and McDonald instead vindicated values championed largely in 
the small towns and rural heartlands of the South, the Midwest, and the 
Mountain states.77  Furthermore, a simple review of state maps in even deep blue 
states like New York demonstrate that the deep progressive, anti-gun views are 
limited to a distinct minority of counties within the state.78 
                                                 
 69. Kahan, supra note 66, at 4. 
 70. Id. at 4–5. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 73. David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century—And Its Lessons 
for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1527, 1553 (2012). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1553–54 (quoting the celebrated scholar of American history—and two-time winner 
of the Pulitzer Prize—Professor Richard Hofstadter). 
 76. See id. at 1554. 
 77. See Kahan, supra note 66, at 4; Terry L. Schell, et al., State-Level Estimates of Household 
Firearm Ownership, RAND CORPORATION 21 (April 21, 2020), https://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/tools/TL354.html (Chart of household gun ownership rates of all fifty states shows the highest 
in Montana at 66% to the lowest in Massachusetts at 15%). 
 78. David LaPell, Why Don’t Gun Owners Just Move From Where They Lose Their Rights?, 
AMMOLAND (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ammoland.com/2018/12/why-dont-gun-owners-move-
lose-their-rights/. 
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a.  Enforcing the Right To Bear Arms Fits Squarely Within The Supreme 
Court’s Role of Protecting Minorities 
Rather than requiring the Court to vindicate or invent a minority right that has 
no populist or popular support in America, enforcing the right to bear arms 
against a very few outlier jurisdictions fits squarely within one of the Court’s 
traditional roles, that is, protecting local minorities from hostile legislation that 
is out of step with, and contrary to, the national baseline.79 
According to Pew Research Center, which is hardly part of a vast right-wing 
conspiracy, “at least two-thirds of American adults have lived in a household 
with one or more guns at some point in their lives.”80  Approximately forty-one 
percent of U.S. adults say they live in a gun-owning household.81  About sixty-
six percent of American adults either currently own a gun or say that they might 
own one in the future.82  About forty-eight percent of U.S. adults say they grew 
up in a gun-owing household.83  About sixty-seven percent of all gun owners 
say that a major reason for owing a gun is self-protection.84  Fifty-eight percent 
of male gun owners go to a shooting range, thirty-seven percent go hunting, 
twenty-seven attend gun shows, forty-three watch gun-oriented television or 
videos, thirty-nine frequent gun websites, and about one in ten gun owners 
participate in online forums or listen to podcasts or radio shows about guns.85  
Over 19 million Americans (some seven percent of the adult population) are 
licensed to carry a concealed firearm.86  This last figure is actually an 
underestimate because there are eighteen “constitutional carry” states that do not 
require any sort of permit to carry.  Even in those states that require a permit to 
carry a concealed handgun, most allow open carry without a permit.  So, how 
many more people than these 19 million are carrying guns outside of the home 
every day and are doing so legally without a permit? 
Assuming that the Pew numbers about U.S. adults are reasonably correct, then 
that means the following (using 2019 population figures): 
• More than 169 million adult Americans have lived in a home with one 
or more guns at some point during their lives.87 
                                                 
 79. See Klarman, supra note 2, at 16; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 370. 
 80. Parker, supra note 37, at 4. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 16. 
 83. Id. at 23. 
 84. Id. at 8, 21. 
 85. Id. at 8. 
 86. New Concealed Carry Report for 2020: 19.48 Million Permit Holders, 820,000 More 
Than Last Year Despite Many States Shutting Down Issuing Permits because of the Coronavirus, 
CRIME PREVENTION RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://crimeresearch.org/2020/10/new-concealed-
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states-shutting-down-issuing-permits-becauseof-the-coronavirus/. 
 87. 328,239,523 total U.S. population times 77.6 percent (percentage of population over 18 
years of age) equals 254,713,869 adults.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts, (July 1, 2019), 
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• More than 104 million adult Americans currently live in a gun-owning 
household.88 
• More than 168 million adult Americans either currently own a firearm 
or say that they might own a firearm in the future.89 
• More than 122 million adult Americans grew up in households with 
firearms.90 
Almost 20 million American have permits to conceal carry firearms, and this 
number is likely a gross underestimate of the number of Americans who carry 
firearms outside of the home.91  The almost 20 million figure is likely an 
underestimate because many states stopped or slowed their issuance of 
concealed handgun permits during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, and another 
issue arises from the fact that in approximately eighteen states, citizens may 
carry firearms without a permit. 
The right to bear arms is thus an extremely popular right nationwide.  It is not 
akin to the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade in which the Court 
struck down at a single stroke popularly adopted abortion restrictions in 30 
states92; a then anti-majoritarian decision whose timing even the late Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has previously criticized.93 
Instead, the right to keep and bear arms should fit a different philosophical 
model: the Supreme Court’s practice of protecting constitutional rights that are 
popular nationwide against infringement by local outliers in local jurisdictions 
oppressing local minorities.  It is this model that caused the Supreme Court to 
strike down Connecticut’s ban on contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
which merely enforced a mainstream national norm against an extremely 
unusual local law, and to invalidate Texas’s anti-sodomy in Lawrence.94 
So too with the right to bear arms.  Given their status as extreme outliers, “may 
issue” permit carry laws and similar firearms regulations and restrictions are 
arguably the modern analogues of bans on contraceptives in the 1960s.  “May 
issue” gun control laws give government law enforcement agencies (frequently 
                                                 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219. 254,713,869 multiplied by 2/3 of 
American adults equals 169,639,439.  See also Parker, supra note 37, at 4. 
 88. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 87; see also Parker, supra note 37, at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 87; see also Parker, supra note 37, at 23. 
 91. New Concealed Carry Report For 2020: 19.48 Million Permit Holders, 820,000 More 
Than Last Year Despite Many States Shutting Down Issuing Permits because of the Coronavirus, 




 92. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973). 
 93. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Decision Came Too Soon, ABA 
J. (Feb. 13, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_ginsburg_roe_ 
v._wade_decision_came_too_soon. 
 94. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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overseen by local politicians who are hostile to gun rights) the discretion to 
decide which citizens have government permission to possess or carry  firearms. 
Gun owners living today in Manhattan or San Francisco face the same 
challenges as earlier local minorities living in hostile jurisdictions.  These “may 
issue” jurisdictions are out of step with the national mainstream both 
constitutionally and in reality, and they should be brought in line with the rest of 
the country. 
It is not a coincidence that all of the Supreme Court decisions that 
reinvigorated the Second Amendment in the 21st century arose as challenges to 
draconian handgun bans enacted by large urban governments in the North and 
East95: most prominently, Dick Heller sued the District of Columbia and Otis 
McDonald sued Chicago.96  When those cases were argued before the Court, 
more than three dozen States—from Texas to Michigan, from Washington to 
Virginia—filed an amicus brief urging the Court to recognize an individual right 
to keep and bear arms.97  Only three States—Illinois, Maryland, and New 
Jersey—urged the Supreme Court to repudiate any such individual right and to 
uphold the challenged municipal ban on handguns.98 
Today, gun owners are a discrete and insular minority in the heavily urbanized 
North.  And just as the segregationists of the States of the former Confederacy 
had contempt for their citizens’ right to equal protection of the law, those living 
in large urban centers or “metropolitan majorities”99—New York (New York 
City), New Jersey (Newark and Trenton), Massachusetts (Boston), Maryland 
(Baltimore), the District of Columbia, plus Illinois (Chicago), California (many 
jurisdictions, including San Francisco and Los Angeles) and Hawaii 
(Honolulu)—have contempt for their citizens’ right to bear arms.100  The 
                                                 
 95. These are the types of urban jurisdictions that former Chicago Mayor and President 
Obama’s former chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel recently referred to as Metropolitan Majorities.  
Rahm Emanuel Democrats May be Blowing Their Chance, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2020), 
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 96. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008) (striking down “a District 
of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home.”); McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (striking down a Chicago ordinance “effectively banning 
handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.”).  The case that would 
have been the Supreme Court’s third Second Amendment decision involved a challenge to an 
ordinance enacted by New York City, but the case was held to be rendered moot by an amendment 
to the ordinance.  See New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d 
Cir. 2018), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam).  Finally, the per curiam decision in Caetano 
v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016), likewise involved a law enacted by a Northern urban 
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 97. E.g., Brief of the States of Texas et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
 98. See Brief for the States of Ill., Md., and N.J. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
 99. Emanuel, supra note 95. 
 100. Finding further proof that these urban elites view their fellow countrymen and women in 
rural America with disdain, one need look no further than the comments by Hillary Rodham Clinton 
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national divide on the Second Amendment is a canyon, not a ditch—there is a 
yawning chasm between two groups of Americans who caricature and demonize 
one another.  On one side are the “effete” members of the self-proclaimed 
metropolitan intelligentsia; on the other are the rural, working-class and small-
town voters of middle America whom then-Presidential-candidate Barack 
Obama once described as “bitter” people who “cling to guns or religion” as a 
way to vent their frustrations with life.101  Then-presidential candidate Hillary 
Rodham Clinton offered a similar comment when she referred to many of 
Donald Trump’s supporters as a “basket of deplorables.”102 
b.  Is the Supreme Court Finally Getting It? 
Until the New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York case 
before the Court in the 2019 term,103 the Supreme Court had not heard oral 
argument in a Second Amendment case since 2010, when the Court struck down 
Chicago’s total ban on private ownership of handguns.104  And while the Court 
granted review in the City of New York case, the City amended its ordinance – 
which had prohibited transporting a handgun outside of the licensed premises — 
in a manner that, according to the majority, gave the petitioners the relief they 
sought, rendering the case moot.105  Concurring, Justice Kavanaugh opined that 
“some federal and state courts may not be properly applying Heller and 
McDonald” and that the Court “should address that issue soon . . . .”106 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas, dissented, 
arguing that the case was not moot.107  On the merits, Justice Alito would have 
held that the amended ordinance violated the Second Amendment.  No 
comparable laws existed when the Second Amendment was adopted,108 the 
lower court failed to apply heightened scrutiny in holding that the law promoted 
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public safety,109 and the ordinance violated the very right recognized in 
Heller.110 
In contrast, in that same period, the Justices heard arguments in approximately 
three dozen cases involving the First Amendment and two dozen cases involving 
the Fourth Amendment, even though those constitutional provisions—unlike the 
Second Amendment—have for many decades been the subject of enormous 
bodies of Supreme Court precedent.  In the words of Justice Thomas, “[t]his 
discrepancy is inexcusable.”111  For judges “who work in marbled halls, guarded 
constantly by a vigilant and dedicated police force, the guarantees of the Second 
Amendment might seem antiquated and superfluous.  But the Framers made a 
clear choice: They reserved to all Americans the right to bear arms for self-
defense.”112  The federal courts should not “stand by idly while a State denies 
its citizens that right, particularly when their very lives may depend on it.”113 
The Roberts Court should take inspiration from Carolene Products Footnote 
Four and its discrete and insular minorities jurisprudence and protect those 
Americans seeking to exercise their fundamental constitutional rights to keep 
and bear arms in politically hostile metropolitan areas.  Or, perhaps, the Roberts 
Court should deploy the Supreme Court’s longstanding national baseline test to 
protect these same Americans who desire to do nothing more than enjoy the 
freedom to bear arms like the Americans in the vast majority of jurisdictions 
across the United States. 
IV.  NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO USE THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL TOOLS AT ITS DISPOSAL UNDER FOOTNOTE FOUR AND THE 
COURT’S NATIONAL BASELINE PROTECTION DOCTRINE TO PROTECT THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF AMERICANS LIVING UNDER METROPOLITAN 
MAJORITIES 
In the years since deciding Heller (2008) and McDonald (2010), the Supreme 
Court has failed to use the jurisprudential tools at its disposal to ensure that the 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms is accorded protection on a par with 
other enumerated constitutional rights.  Regardless of the jurisprudential 
methodology you apply (originalism, Warren/Burger era jurisprudence or 
otherwise), the Supreme Court must do more to protect gun owners. 
The Supreme Court was well ahead of American public sentiment when it 
ventured into the areas of abortion and gay rights.  Even those who support 
abortion rights recognize that the Court “may have moved too quickly when it 
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found a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade,114 according to the late 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.”115  During a speech at a Columbia Law School 
symposium in 2012, Justice Ginsburg surveyed four decades of electoral and 
judicial controversy on abortion and noted that, rather than granting review in 
Roe, the Supreme Court could have delayed hearing the case while state law 
evolved on the issue: “It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too far 
too fast,” she said.116  Alternatively, she noted, the Court could have invalidated 
the particular Texas statute “without finding a right to privacy that overturned 
abortion bans nationwide,” contending that “[t]hings might have turned out 
differently if the Court had been more restrained.”117  When Roe v. Wade was 
decided in 1973, women could legally seek an abortion in only four states 
although abortions were available on a limited basis in about sixteen other 
states.118 
The Supreme Court was also ahead of public sentiment when it legalized gay 
marriage, although the gap between the Court and the American electorate was 
perhaps not as wide.  In 2012, same-sex marriage was legal in only six states.119  
By 2013, when the Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act120—
which had barred federal recognition of same-sex unions—twelve states had 
made gay marriage legal.121  However, “the vast majority of states [still] 
ban[ned] such unions, and 31 of them ha[d] amended their constitutions to 
enshrine the traditional definition of heterosexual marriage.”122 
The treatment of the right to keep and bear arms in the federal courts stands 
in stark contrast.  Rather than being ahead of popular opinion or at least keeping 
pace with it, the federal judiciary has lagged well behind it.  For decades the 
federal courts routinely and almost summarily rejected Second Amendment 
claims.  For example, in 1982 the Seventh Circuit in Chicago upheld a municipal 
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ordinance outlawing the possession of handguns even in one’s home.123  The 
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal and that decision remained the law for 
a quarter-century until a similar ban on handguns in Washington, D.C. was 
overturned in 2008 in the Court’s landmark Heller decision.  Until 2001, in the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Emerson,124 no federal appellate court 
had held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and 
bear arms for purely private, civilian purposes.125  Many lower federal courts 
continued—right up to the Heller decision—to rule that the Second Amendment 
protects only the states’ prerogatives with respect to their militias and does not 
recognize an individual right.126 
In the decade since the Supreme Court reinvigorated the Second Amendment 
with its originalist decisions in Heller and McDonald, the individual right to 
keep and bear arms has been ill-used by, and when used, abused by, the lower 
federal courts.127  Those lower federal courts have upheld: (1) statutes from New 
York, New Jersey, Maryland and California denying law-abiding citizens the 
right to carry a concealed weapon for self-defense;128 (2) laws from Illinois, 
Maryland, New York, Connecticut and the District of Columbia banning widely 
popular and commonly owned semiautomatic rifles and ammunition 
magazines;129 (3) a California ban on the sale of types of ammunition commonly 
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used for self-defense by both civilians and law-enforcement officers;130 and (4) 
a California law mandating waiting periods for the purchase of firearms.131  In 
sum, as Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, and the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia have protested, “the lower courts are resisting th[e] [Supreme] 
Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald.”132  This unacceptable state of affairs 
is undisputed; the mainstream news media have noted that the “[f]ederal courts 
are quietly allowing gun control—and [the Supreme Court] is letting them.”133 
Consider what has been happening in the largest federal appellate court, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes the states 
of California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Arizona, 
and Alaska.  The Ninth Circuit applies a double standard: one rule for 
constitutional rights that it likes (such as abortion) and a different rule for rights 
it disfavors (most prominently the Second Amendment).134  The Ninth Circuit 
struck down an Arizona statute that “‘delayed’ women seeking an abortion.”135  
“The court found it important there,” with respect to a statutory waiting period 
for an abortion, “that the State ‘presented no evidence whatsoever that the law 
furthers its interest’ and ‘no evidence that its alleged danger exists or has ever 
occurred.’”136  Yet when it came to a statutory waiting period to purchase a 
firearm, the Ninth Circuit did not care that the state of California presented no 
evidence that such a period would make any difference in firearms violence; the 
Ninth Circuit approved the waiting period “based solely on its own ‘common 
sense.’”137  The Ninth Circuit also “struck down a county’s 5-day waiting period 
for nude-dancing licenses because it ‘unreasonably prevented a dancer from 
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exercising first amendment rights while an application was pending.’”138  “The 
Ninth Circuit found it dispositive there,” where the (apparently) very important 
constitutional right to dance naked on a bar for tips was at issue, that “the county 
‘failed to demonstrate a need for the five-day delay period,’”139 yet no such 
dearth of evidence troubled the Ninth Circuit when it upheld a gun-purchase 
waiting period.  As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent, “[i]n the Ninth 
Circuit, it seems, rights that have no basis in the Constitution receive greater 
protection than the Second Amendment, which is enumerated in the text.”140 
The problem is not only the misapplication of Supreme Court precedent by 
the lower federal courts; rather, the bigger problem is that the Supreme Court 
for ten years refused to consider any Second Amendment challenge141 and 
thereby allowed the individual’s right to keep and bear arms to be disregarded 
by state and federal judges who disdain the Second Amendment.142  As Justice 
Thomas explained when the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from a 
Ninth Circuit decision upholding California’s ten-day waiting period on the 
purchase of firearms in Silvester v. Becerra in 2016: 
 [The Supreme Court’s] continued refusal to hear Second 
Amendment cases only enables this kind of defiance. . . .  If this case 
involved one of the Court’s more favored rights, I sincerely doubt we 
would have denied certiorari.  I suspect that four Members of this 
Court would vote to review a 10-day waiting period for abortions, 
notwithstanding a State’s purported interest in creating a ‘cooling off’ 
period. . . .  I also suspect that four Members of this Court would vote 
to review a 10-day waiting period on the publication of racist speech, 
notwithstanding a State’s purported interest in giving the speaker time 
to calm down. . . .  Similarly, four Members of this Court would vote 
to review even a 10-minute delay of a traffic stop . . . .  The Court 
would take these cases because abortion, speech, and the Fourth 
Amendment are three of its favored rights.  The right to keep and bear 
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arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.  And the lower 
courts seem to have gotten the message.143 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed a similar protest when the Supreme Court 
refused to hear an appeal from a Ninth Circuit decision upholding California’s 
statutory scheme allowing localities to deny virtually every application for a 
concealed-carry permit: 
 The Court’s decision to deny certiorari in this case reflects a 
distressing trend: the treatment of the Second Amendment as a 
disfavored right. . . . The Constitution does not rank certain rights 
above others, and [we] do not think this Court should impose such a 
hierarchy by selectively enforcing its preferred rights.144 
Speaking to the Federalist Society in 2020, Justice Alito stated that “the 
ultimate second tier constitutional right in the minds of some is the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  From 2010 when we decided 
McDonald vs. Chicago until last term, the Supreme Court denied every single 
petition asking us to review a lower court decision that rejected the Second 
Amendment claim.”145  He went on to describe how, when the Court decided the 
New York City case in 2020, it “said nothing about the Second Amendment.”146 
Defenders of the Court’s reluctance to enforce the Second Amendment more 
aggressively might suggest that the Court has appropriately held back to allow 
lower courts a chance to develop the doctrine in this fraught area.  But the lower 
courts have by now had ample opportunity to weigh the various considerations 
relevant to the scope of the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court has had 
ample time to determine the policy implications of the principal disputed issues. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should act now to protect all Americans that desire to 
exercise their fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms from 
hostile, local jurisdictions.  Actual or potential gun owners who are seeking to 
exercise their fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms in these 
jurisdictions are entitled to the protections allotted under the preferred freedoms 
doctrine set forth in Carolene Products Footnote Four. 
The Supreme Court also should enforce gun rights against those few outlier 
jurisdictions that seek to restrict the fundamental constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms under the Second Amendment.  In those few jurisdictions, gun owners 
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or those who wish to own guns who are deterred by onerous, likely 
unconstitutional regulations are the sort of discrete and insular minority that the 
Supreme Court indicated that it would protect in Carolene Products Footnote 
Four. 
By doing so, the Supreme Court would advance two jurisprudential concepts 
it has long viewed as constitutionally appropriate.  These include protecting 
discrete and insular minorities from cultural oppression by an active local 
majority—in this case a metropolitan majority—and striking down outlier laws 
embraced by only a few jurisdictions that chose intentionally to ignore the U.S. 
Constitution as written or be bound by Supreme Court precedent. 
 
